Cases Listed by Subject:
Macri v. Macri, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 362 (2019): In the circumstances of an unallocated support award in a divorce proceeding, the income attributed to the husband was reasonable and supported by the findings and the trial record, where the husband was voluntarily unemployed and not making reasonable efforts to obtain employment, and where there was uncontroverted expert testimony that the husband was highly employable at a salary range matching that of the attributed income [364-367]; further, the unallocated support award was necessary to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed by the recipient spouse and child prior to termination of the marriage.
Rosenwasser v. Rosenwasser, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 577 (2016): This court concluded that a modification judgment of divorce required remand to resolve the questions concerning alimony, where there were gaps in the judge's fact finding and analysis.
Duff-Kareores v. Kareores, 474 Mass. 528 (2016): In a divorce action in which the Probate and Family Court judge concluded that, under the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124, the length of the parties' marriage for purposes of calculating the durational limits of a general term alimony award to the wife was the period from the date of the parties' first marriage through the date that the husband was served with a complaint in the instant (i.e., second) divorce, although the judge did not err in including in the over-all length of marriage the length of the parties' first marriage and a period of cohabitation subsequent to their first divorce in which they had engaged in an economic marital partnership and maintained a common household, the judge erred in including the period from the date of service of the divorce complaint in the first marriage to the date the cohabitation began during which the parties were neither legally married nor engaged in an economic marital partnership.
Chin v. Merriott, 470 Mass. 527 (2015): A Probate and Family Court judge properly dismissed a complaint seeking modification of a judgment of divorce to terminate an obligation to pay alimony that was contained in a provision of a separation agreement that merged with the judgment, where the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 (the "act"), which became effective after the date of entry of the judgment, afforded no basis upon which to terminate the obligation to pay alimony, in that the uncodified sections of the act make clear that the act's provisions for termination of general term alimony upon a payor's reaching full retirement age or upon a recipient's cohabitation and maintenance of a common household with another person for more than three months apply prospectively, and where no other changed circumstances were present that would require an adjustment to the amount of alimony.